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Financial Modernization:
Implications for the Safety Net
Remarks by
Thomas M. Hoenig, President
Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City
Kansas City, Missouri*
It is a pleasure to be here today as part of this panel on deposit
insurance and financial modernization. Over the past twenty years, the
world of finance has changed dramatically. During this period, we have
seen phenomenal growth of new types of securities and derivatives
markets, the globalization of finance and capital flows, and a blurring
of the distinction between banks and other financial intermediaries.
These changes in financial markets have led to public debate among
Congress, financial regulators, and financial industry participants about
the appropriate role for banks, the so-called "financial modernization"
debate. Much of this discussion has centered on the question of whether
we should expand bank powers. I believe, however, that this question
is not very useful to us as policymakers. Modernization and expanded
powers are clearly necessary to allow banks to adapt to the changing
financial world. In my view, a more relevant question is "how does the
expansion of bank powers affect the exposure of the deposit insurance
system and the other components of the safety net?"
The main point I want to make is that the path that banks are
allowed to take in expanding their powers has important implications for
the exposure of the safety net. In my remarks this morning, I would like
to address four questions. First, why do we need a safety net? Second,
why should we be concerned about extending the safety net? Third, in
light of concerns about the structure of the safety net, is it feasible to
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reform the safety net? Finally, how does the approach to financial
modernization affect the exposure of the safety net?
I.

WHY Do WE NEED A SAFETY NET?

Let me begin by defining what I mean by the safety net. The
component of the safety net that receives the most attention is, of course,
deposit insurance. The safety net, however, also includes the Federal
Reserve's lender of last resort function and guaranteed final settlement
on Fedwire, the Federal Reserve's large dollar interbank settlement
system. As we think about the impact of new activities on the exposure
of the safety net, I think it is important that we keep all three components in mind.
The safety net for the banking system has been put in place because
of the unique role that banks play in the financial system-that is
because banks are, and will continue to be thought of as, "special."
Banking is special because, unlike other industries, disruptions in
certain banking activities have negative external effects that extend
beyond banking into other sectors of the economy. Indeed, banking
problems can have a wide-ranging impact on overall economic activity.
To limit the negative externalities associated with banking problems,
most countries have chosen not to leave the fate of the banking industry
solely in the hands of the market and to instead establish some form of
a safety net for banks.
While banks have lost market share in business lending in recent
years, one reason they are special is because they still play a vital role
in satisfying the credit needs of many sectors of the economy. Even
when banks do not directly make the loans themselves, they often
provide letters of credit and other guarantees that ultimately stand
behind nonbank forms of credit. While the health of any single bank
may have little impact on overall economic activity, broader problems in
the banking sector can lead to a credit crunch and reduce economic
activity at the regional, national, and even international levels. One
need look no further than the current banking crises in Southeast Asia
to see how disruptions in bank credit flows can threaten not only the
health of domestic economies, but also the health of economies in other
parts of the world. Closer to home, we all saw how the banking
problems in Texas and the Midwest in the 1980s and New England and
California in the early 1990s reduced credit availability and slowed
economic activity.
A second reason banks are special is their role in the payments
system. A well-functioning payments system is essential to the workings
of a modern economy because serious disruptions to the payments
system impair the ability to complete transactions and adversely affect
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economic activity. The payments system has always revolved around
banks since bank demand deposits serve as the principal noncash means
of payment. In addition, banks perform the function of clearing and
settling almost all noncash payments. The potential for systemic
problems arising from payments failures, particularly payments failures
in large-dollar payments systems, suggests that participants involved in
clearing and settlement operations must be subject to greater scrutiny
than other institutions. Thus, due to the crucial role of banks in credit
markets and the payments system, some form of safety net seems
important and necessary.
II.

WHY SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED ABOUT EXTENDING THE SAFETY
NET?

Given the presence and significance of the safety net, my second
question is: "Why should we care if the safety net is expanded when
new bank activities are permitted?" The answer is that while the safety
net helps protect the economy from the externalities associated with
banking problems, it has its own unique side effects that are costly to
the economy.
The most often mentioned problem is the moral hazard that banks will
take excessive risks to the extent that explicit or implicit government
guarantees remove the incentive for depositors and other creditors to
monitor banks. In particular, the guarantees and reduced private sector
monitoring mean that the cost of risk taking is lower for banks than for
other financial institutions. To the extent they are allowed to do so,
some banks will fund investment projects that might not otherwise be
viable in the sense that the expected returns on the projects are too low.
As a result, the moral hazard problem leads to a misallocation of credit,
which is costly for the economy as a whole because it reduces economic
efficiency.
The increase in risk taking combined with the reduction in private
monitoring leads to an obvious reaction-greater reliance must be placed
on regulatory discipline. Regulatory discipline has its own cost for banks
as it increases the regulatory burden. Beyond banks, however, it is also
costly for regulators who must keep up with the increasing complexity
of ever changing bank activities, and for the economy to the extent that
regulatory rules and decisions lead banks to operate less efficiently.
As banks expand their activities, it is at least possible that the
exposure of the safety net will rise. The concern for policymakers is that
the additional costs associated with an expansion of the safety net will
be greater than the additional benefits. Indeed, some believe the costs
of the safety net as it is currently structured are already greater than
the benefits.
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CAN WE REFORM THE SAFETY NET?

Given the concern about the costs of the safety net, it is natural to ask
whether it is possible to reduce the exposure of the safety net by either
reforming its structure or scaling it back. Proposals for changing the
safety net have tended to focus on deposit insurance reform. Some of the
options that have received the most attention include scaling back
deposit insurance coverage, using subordinated debt to reduce the moral
hazard problems associated with the safety net, relying on private
insurance systems, and creating narrow banks.
Conceptually, I have considerable sympathy for reforming the safety
net. The difficulty with changing the safety net, of course, is that it
increases the potential for the systemic problems that the safety net was
designed to prevent. I have argued elsewhere that safety net reform
would be more feasible if we shift our regulatory focus from protecting
individual banks to preventing problems at one or a few banks from
spreading throughout the system. By protecting the banking system in
this way, individual institutions could fail without necessarily threatening the financial system. To the extent that systemic risk does decline,
we could reduce the scale of the safety net and place greater reliance on
market discipline because individual failures would be less threatening
to the economy.
From a practical standpoint, however, I wonder whether we can
realistically reform or scale back the safety net in the near term for two
reasons. First, I do not see a public mandate for reducing safety net
coverage. Second, even apart from whether an attempt to scale back the
safety net would be politically feasible, it is unlikely that a reduced
safety net would be credible. Recent experience in the United States and
other industrialized and developing countries suggests that governments
are inclined to bail out both depositors and other creditors to preserve
stability in times of financial crisis even when there are no explicit
guarantees. Again, the current events in Southeast Asia illustrate just
how intense the pressure is to contain a crisis, even when it means some
depositors and creditors might be protected. With the globalization of
financial markets, few countries are willing to allow banking problems
to jeopardize their reputation and access to international capital
markets. At the same time, other countries have an incentive to lend
assistance to prevent significant disruptions in trade and capital flows.
Thus, while fundamental safety net reform should remain our long-term
goal, the realities of the economic environment make such reform
difficult to achieve.
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IV. How DOES THE APPROACH TO FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFFECT
THE EXPOSURE OF THE SAFETY NET?

If we assume then, that the safety net will remain basically as we
know it today, how will financial modernization affect the exposure of
the safety net? The answer depends on the approach banks are allowed
to take in adopting new powers. One approach is to permit new
activities to be conducted within the bank itself. The key policy issue
raised by this approach is that it necessarily increases the exposure of
the safety net to the new activities. As a result, the new activities would
have to be regulated and supervised the same way as other bank
activities.
Whether this is the best approach to financial modernization depends
on the relative benefits and costs of allowing the bank to directly conduct
the new activities. On the benefit side, allowing banks to engage in new
activities that have synergies with existing activities may be efficient for
the economy as a whole. In addition, while new activities may be risky,
modern portfolio theory suggests that what matters is not the risk of
individual activities but the risk of the overall portfolio of activities.
Thus, it is possible that allowing banks to directly engage in new
activities will reduce their overall risk through greater diversification.
On the cost side, allowing banks to directly conduct new activities
expands the costs associated with safety nets that I noted earlier. To
the extent that banks do not bear the full social costs of their activities,
they may make loans or engage in other activities that might not
otherwise be viable. In addition, this increase in moral hazard makes
it necessary to extend regulation and prudential supervision to new
activities. For example, new activities would have to be regulated under
a safety and soundness criterion rather than the less extensive fraud
and disclosure requirements for market-based activities. Thus, as
activities are expanded within the bank, there is a greater regulatory
burden for banks, greater costs for bank regulators, and perhaps less
efficient decisions by banks.
The alternative to conducting new activities directly in the bank is to
conduct them in affiliates or subsidiaries that are separated and
insulated from the bank with firewalls. The advantage of isolating new
activities in this way is that it would limit the exposure of the safety net
to new risks, thereby better controlling the costs associated with
extending the safety net. In particular, while some oversight would still
be required, the degree of regulation necessary to control moral hazard
would be substantially less than if the activities were conducted in the
bank itself. In general, supervision and regulation could be designed to
focus on transactions and other relationships between the bank and the
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affiliate. More specifically, the role of supervision would be to make sure
that affiliates operate as separate entities, do not expose banks to
additional risks, and do not gain an advantage over nonbank firms by
exploiting the safety net.
The disadvantage of this approach is that although some of the
synergies remain, there would be reduced direct benefits of new
activities for the bank. Furthermore, some additional regulation and
supervision would be necessary, although as I just mentioned, it would
be less than if new activities were conducted directly by the bank.
V. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I am convinced that financial modernization and
expanded powers are inevitable, as banks must adapt to a changing
financial world. For me, a key issue is the impact of modernization on
the safety net. While the safety net serves an important role in helping
to preserve financial stability, it also increases moral hazard. As a
result, it is necessary to regulate banks differently than financial and
nonfinancial firms that are not protected by a safety net. While I am in
favor of safety net reform, it will require a sea change in attitude by the
public, and this strikes me as unlikely as I view the past and current
environment. Thus, as we proceed with financial modernization, we
must first be aware of its impact on the safety net. Then, we should
proceed only after a careful balancing of the private and social costs and
benefits of new activities and, to the extent possible, in a way that limits
further inadvertent extension of the safety net to new activities and
firms.

